I’m still digesting my pages and pages of notes, and ordering my thoughts, so take this as a non-exhaustive list:
1. Collapse of GBV services following the expulsion of the humanitarians
If there was one issue I could get a spot on CNN to talk about, it would be this.
I had an inkling of it from people I had spoken to before I went, but once you are actually in Darfur, it hits you with neon lights. The world has been focusing on the so-called “life-saving” gaps after the expulsions. The fact there are no more services for rape survivors has been sidelined and everyone in Darfur is scared to talk about it. The IDPs because of the stigma, the aid workers because of fear of expulsion. (I have an op ed on this which I am holding off posting here until I can get a paper to publish it because it needs to reach more people than will get to it through this site)
2. Gen. Agwai’s comments re. The war is over
Two points on this. Firstly, it’s hard to distinguish ‘the war is over’ from ‘the war is in temporary respite because of rains/fractured rebels/focus on the elections’. Secondly, even to the extent this is a permanent change, it’s still somewhat irrelevant from the perspective of the IDPs. The real issue is how insecurity (as a result of the war) has squeezed the humanitarian space.
Humanitarian ops have been progressively moved from “deep field” to “field” and are now almost entirely confined to the major towns because of insecurity. There are many humanitarians interested in moving to the kind of ‘early recovery’ programs that this stagnation in the conflict might otherwise warrant, but it’s impossible to do so under the current conditions. So everyone remains in a limbo state of emergency provisions. Bottom line: I wouldn’t say Gen. Agwai’s comments are “wrong” but rather very much beside the point.
3. UNAMID capability
They probably will be close to 100% deployment by February next year (I was told that those in NY predicting 97% by December have not taken into account the logistical problems that come with the rainy season – if true, how this is possible six years into involvement with a region that has a predictable rainy season every year – – I don’t even want to think about). However this will only translate to (most optimistically) 60% capability. In part because of the quality of the troops (for instance many consider a “long-range patrol” to mean being out of the compound for 3-4 hrs, whereas to reach many areas they need to be able to undertake patrols of 3-4 days in length) and in part because of the continued failure of the world to come up with the attack helicopters they need to actually respond quickly to incidents.
4. Returns
In general, I would say the GOS just wants the camps to be gone. From their perspective they are an eyesore that stops the international community from “moving on” from Darfur. I heard of various attempts by the government to bus back “voluntary” returns, as well as the GOS escorting UNAMID staff to “witness” returns (that the staff I spoke with thought did not seem to be the people who were originally displaced from the area). Relatedly, IDPs are continuing to report occupation of their land by foreigners and rumors abound that these people have been given national IDs (but verification of this is very difficult).
It is true that people are going back to plant, as they always do at this time of year. It is also true that people who go back are generally finding it more peaceful than last year. For those who want to stay, they should of course be supported in their decision. But there are many steps before these isolated examples can be translated into a “trend” of sustainable returns – – those who are pointing to such a trend are, in my view, jumping the gun.
Moreover, we should be very wary not to generalize from one locality to another. Returns decisions are based on local circumstances. A sense that it is safe to return in one locality shouldn’t be used to argue that it is therefore safe to go back to anywhere in Darfur.