SLA rebels at Ain Siro
A couple of days ago I did a post on the village of Ain Siro, where I was last weekend. Before I went, there had been some news reports of fighting in the area, and when I was there people said that Chadian rebels had been trying to get in. They also reported being angry with UNAMID for coming towards what is SLA-held territory without first notifying the rebel area commanders.
In a private conversation I suggested that perhaps UNAMID was just trying to investigate the reports about the fighting and the Chadian rebels, but was told that since the SLA don’t trust UNAMID, anytime UNAMID tries to come near without first getting clearance they become suspicious of UNAMID’s intentions.
This business of getting clearance has become one of the all-consuming activities of UNAMID’s daily work. This was an example from the rebel side, but usually it is from the government side.
Spend some time hanging round UNAMID staff and there is an observation you will hear repeated time and again, albeit in various guises. The essence of it is that unlike the “traditional” scenario in which peacekeepers are deployed – a failed state context – UNAMID is operating in an environment where there is an extremely (the word “extremely” always gets extra emphasis) strong central government.
The observation is 100% accurate, but it is also frustrating to listen to because it is invariably used to explain why UNAMID cannot do anything without the Sudanese government’s clearance – which in turn leaves one wondering how we have ended up in a situation where the international force that advocates thought was being deployed to protect civilians from, among other acts of violence, government-sponsored violence, cannot operate except with the approval of said government.
The consequences flowing from the fact that UNAMID is not an invading force, and that it is only there at the consent of the Sudanese government, is something that I don’t think advocates, myself included, really had our heads around when UNAMID was first deployed. And it certainly is not something the displaced populations understood when they were pinning their hopes on what a transition from AMIS to UNAMID might bring.
While we knew, intellectually, that since the political stomach (let alone policy validity) for the invasion of yet another Muslim country was not in existence and therefore that the consent of the government was required, there was this sense that if only the blue helmets were on the ground, it would somehow all start to move it the right direction.
It was wishful, but not impossible thinking.
UNAMID in El Fasher farewelling General Gration before we left for Ain Siro
Had UNAMID gone in with both strong capabilities on the ground and unified international political support, its relationship with the Sudanese government need not have been as unbalanced as it has since become. But neither the capability nor the unified political support was there. So today it is an uphill battle, for those few frustrated individuals within UNAMID that are keen to push the envelope.
Since I left Ain Siro there have been further reports of fighting in the area and a couple of days ago the UNAMID spokesperson, Noureddine Mezni, released this statement: “We are waiting to send an urgent mission there to verify and assess the security and humanitarian situation.” What are they waiting for? You guessed it – clearance. After further inquiries, I was sent this excerpt of a UNAMID report:
“UNAMID attempted to send an investigative patrol to Korma on 18 September, but was informed by SLA/AW that fighting was ongoing and that it was not safe. A follow-up patrol the next day, 19 September, stopped 15 kms away from Korma, at Dirma village, and did not proceed following advice from the GoS that security could not be guaranteed. The patrol interacted with a Sheikh at the Bilala Joruf village (41 kms from Tawilla), who reported heavy GoS military and Arab militia presence in Korma. A patrol scheduled for 20 September was cancelled due to the lack of security guarantees from both GoS and SLA/AW.”
This is the reality of UNAMID. It is an operation tasked with protecting civilians, but dependent on the Parties who put civilians at risk to provide its peacekeepers with enough security to even attempt to undertake their task.
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