Twenty-four hours after the fact, the initially rosy press bites on the Abyei decision are starting to take on a tinge of gray.
Immediately after the ruling, the GOS delegate to the PCA tribunal in The Hague said “We welcome the fact that the oil fields are now excluded from the Abyei area, particularly the Heglig oil field . . . [which is] . . . returning to the north”. However today, Edward Lino, former SPLM Administrator of Abyei, suggested that the Heglig oil fields are still up for grabs, echoing a statement Riek Machar made on the Sudan Radio Service yesterday, that “the people of the south will still have a chance to discuss this ruling [on the Heglig oil fields] with the north-south border committee” with Western Upper Nile (as it is called by the GOSS)/ Unity State (as it is called by the GOS) arguing that it falls in their state, not in the North.
In other words, despite statements from the GOSS that they will accept the ruling, not all Southerners agree the issue is settled with respect to whether they have actually lost Heglig.
During the Interim period, the oil revenues from the “Abyei area” were split between the GOS, the GOSS, the Bahr el Ghazal region, Western Kordofan, and locally with the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya people. With the key oilfields now demarcated to be outside the “Abyei area” the absolute revenue going to each of these parties drops significantly. Any looming fight over whether or not Heglig is in Western Upper Nile/ Unity State will be driven by this ‘bottom line’ calculation of whether the revenue from Helig will now go to the North or the South.
The other potential flashpoint to keep an eye on is the reaction of the Misseriya. While the GOS says that the decision ensures the rights of the Misseriya, discussions I have had with Sudanese friends and colleagues since the ruling suggest that a significant number of Misseriya feel that the GOS has sold them out. The GOS is happy because it was awarded the key oil fields – but in the process the Misseriya have lost land that they thought was theirs. As with the Arab tribes with the respect to the Darfur Peace Agreement, we should not be too quick to assume that the GOS looks out for the interests of those who are nominally on its side . . .
A lot of analysts seem to be saying that the initial relief was misplaced. How long do you think the possibility of violence and tensions will remain? Through next year’s elections? Through the referendum? And if Southerners wanted to press their claims to Helig, do you think they’d have a serious chance of modifying the ruling?
Hi Alex
I think the possibility of violence remains through to the referendum and beyond.
Under Garang I thought there was a chance of a unified Sudan with some peace and stability. Since his death, the vision he held on that score has been consistently undermined and the GOS has not put in the hard yards required to make unity an attractive option to most Southerners. Thus I think a vote for secession is likely, and I have never believed the NCP would allow this without a fight. In some ways the more oil fields the South manages to claim before the referendum, the bigger the fight against them gaining independence will be – the more they gain, the more Khartoum loses.
As for the ruling, there is no chance of successfully challenging it – not only as a legal matter, but also it would be politically untenable for either side to even try. The only question is whether the SPLM wants to pursue the claim of Helig as belonging to Western Upper Nile. . .