In Obama we trust (?)

100 days in Office.

No progress on Darfur.

The hope held by so many is being put to the test.

It’s an old story – We look at a situation of failure and say “if only” factor X was different, the problem would be resolved. It’s a trap many advocates walked themselves into at the end of the Bush term. “If only” U.S. leadership were different, we could have made progress on Darfur – so the theory went.Przepraszam, ten artykul jest dostępny tylko w języku angielskim

100 days in Office.

No progress on Darfur.

The hope held by so many is being put to the test.

It’s an old story – We look at a situation of failure and say “if only” factor X was different, the problem would be resolved. It’s a trap many advocates walked themselves into at the end of the Bush term. “If only” U.S. leadership were different, we could have made progress on Darfur – so the theory went.

To many in the U.S.-based advocacy community, Obama seemed like the ultimate candidate: He had visited Darfur, had Samantha Power advising him, and  – as Eric Reeves (in yet another example of his dogged documentation of what every public official has ever said on Darfur) has just pointed out – candidate Obama labeled the Bush Administration’s move towards normalizing relations with Khartoum a “reckless and cynical initiative.” A view perfectly aligned with the advocacy community’s distaste for “rewarding” a genocidal regime.

Upon taking office, Obama announced his Administration would undertake a “Sudan policy review.” At first, advocates thought this seemed like a sensible approach. There were a few eyebrows raised when it seemed to be taking a long time for the Administration to appoint a Special Envoy (the benefits of such a position have never been as self-evident to me as seemingly everyone else in the advocacy community – but I’ll save that thought for a later post). However candidate Obama’s position on Darfur had earned him enough trust among advocates that they were willing to give him the benefit of the doubt . . . for a time.

But at the 100 day mark, with no results of the review forthcoming, and reports the Administration is moving towards the very policy of normalization that candidate Obama decried, the grace period maybe drawing to a close.

The people I interviewed in the Bush Administration will be following these developments with interest. Many a State Department employee has argued to me that if we’re not going to “invade” Sudan, then policy-wise we are stuck in a world of carrots and sticks. That being the case, “normalization” is the most attractive carrot on offer – – the one that could actually create an incentive for behavioral change by the regime in Khartoum.

Of course, advocates raised hell anytime it looked like the Bush Administration was moving in the direction of normalization. The interesting question in the coming weeks is whether they will unleash the same outcry against an Administration that they have a predisposition towards trusting. And if they do, what the reaction of the Administration will be . . .

To many in the U.S.-based advocacy community, Obama seemed like the ultimate candidate: He had visited Darfur, had Samantha Power advising him, and  – as Eric Reeves (in yet another example of his dogged documentation of what every public official has ever said on Darfur) has just pointed out – candidate Obama labeled the Bush Administration’s move towards normalizing relations with Khartoum a “reckless and cynical initiative.” A view perfectly aligned with the advocacy community’s distaste for “rewarding” a genocidal regime.

Upon taking office, Obama announced his Administration would undertake a “Sudan policy review.” At first, advocates thought this seemed like a sensible approach. There were a few eyebrows raised when it seemed to be taking a long time for the Administration to appoint a Special Envoy (the benefits of such a position have never been as self-evident to me as seemingly everyone else in the advocacy community – but I’ll save that thought for a later post). However candidate Obama’s position on Darfur had earned him enough trust among advocates that they were willing to give him the benefit of the doubt . . . for a time.

But at the 100 day mark, with no results of the review forthcoming, and reports the Administration is moving towards the very policy of normalization that candidate Obama decried, the grace period maybe drawing to a close.

The people I interviewed in the Bush Administration will be following these developments with interest. Many a State Department employee has argued to me that if we’re not going to “invade” Sudan, then policy-wise we are stuck in a world of carrots and sticks. That being the case, “normalization” is the most attractive carrot on offer – – the one that could actually create an incentive for behavioral change by the regime in Khartoum.

Of course, advocates raised hell anytime it looked like the Bush Administration was moving in the direction of normalization. The interesting question in the coming weeks is whether they will unleash the same outcry against an Administration that they have a predisposition towards trusting. And if they do, what the reaction of the Administration will be . . .